When selling electronic products, manufacturers and retailers often o er rebates to stimulate sales.
Introduction
Ever since Proctor and Gamble issued rebate coupons to consumers in the 1970s, many manufacturers and retailers have followed suit. Grow (2005) estimates that over 400 million rebate programs are o ered in the US with a total face value of US$6 billion each year. According to a report issued by the Food Marketing Institute (www.fmi.org) in 2006, 21% of shoppers use coupons every time they shop at a supermarket. Rebates are even more popular with consumers shopping for home appliances or electronics: NPD Group (www.npd.com) reports that 20% of digital products (cameras, camcorder, etc.) and 33% of computer hardware products were sold with rebates in 2004. The popularity of rebates in electronic products raises an interesting question: why should manufacturers/retailers o er rebates when they can easily mark down their selling prices temporarily? In addition to the fact that manufacturer rebates enable manufacturers to o er discounts to consumers directly, major bene ts of rebates include:
1. Rebates can stimulate additional sales via a temporary price drop, while maintaining the marked price. Because the marked price never changes, consumers are less resistant to paying the usually marked price once a rebate program is discontinued (Avila and Avila (1986) ). In addition, unlike rebates, price markdowns are often interpreted as a signal for further price drops, which could induce some strategic consumers to delay their purchase (c.f., Elmagrabhy et al. (2008) ).
2. Rebates can be more cost e ective than price markdowns because the actual redemption rate is less than 100%, due to breakage (customers who either forget to redeem or fail to submit the requisite documentation) and slippage (customers who fail to deposit the rebate checks).
According to Grow (2005) , over 40% of all rebates are never redeemed. As a case in point, TiVo's pro t in 2004 increased by US$5 million when over 50,000 of TiVo's new subscribers failed to redeem their US$100 mail-in coupons.
While rebates are recognized as an e ective promotional tool, there are several adverse e ects that include:
1. Rebates can generate less additional demand than price markdowns. Because of additional e orts of redeeming rebates and the temporal di erence between purchasing products and receiving discounts, consumers may consider a rebate of $1 less valuable than a price discount of $1 (e.g., Soman (1998) and Arcelus et al. (2006) ). Customer dissatisfaction with the complicated process of redemption can also generate negative publicity. For instance, in response to overwhelming on-line complaints about its rebate program, Dell shut down its on-line customer service forums in 2005.
2. Rebates can incur higher advertising and distribution costs associated with the rebate promotion and higher processing costs associated with the redemption process.
In view of the pros and cons of rebates, Darlin (2006) reports that some manufacturers (e.g., Dell and Hewlett-Packard) and retailers (e.g., Best Buy and O ceMax) are phasing out their rebate programs to focus more on price reductions or instant rebates. 2 However, NPD Group warns that eliminating rebates can be risky because rebates can drive higher sales and higher store tra c. As manufacturers (e.g., Samsung and Sony) and retailers (e.g., Staples and Fry's) continue to o er rebates, Arar (2007) concludes that rebates will not disappear any time soon.
The current debate over rebates has motivated us to examine a basic question: under what conditions should a rm in a supply chain o er rebates? We construct a model for analyzing the pricing and rebate issues arising in a two-level supply chain that comprises one manufacturer (e.g., Panasonic) and one retailer (e.g., Circuit City). The manufacturer sells a single type of product to customers through the retailer over a selling season. Our model entails a Stackelberg game in which the manufacturer acts as the leader and the retailer as the follower. Each rm (manufacturer or retailer) makes three decisions at the beginning of the selling season: (1) the regular (wholesale or retail) price for the entire selling season; (2) whether or not to o er rebates, and (3) the size of the rebates to be o ered during a pre-speci ed promotion period. We denote`manufacturer rebates' (`retailer rebates') as the rebates o ered by the manufacturer (retailer) to consumers.
The pricing and rebate decisions can be recast in a purely pricing context as follows. When a rm decides not to o er rebates, the corresponding e ective (wholesale or retail) price will be constant; hence, o ering no rebates is similar to an EDLP (Everyday Low Price) format. Alternatively, when a rm o ers rebates, the corresponding e ective (wholesale or retail) price is low during the promotion period and is high for the remainder of the selling season. Hence, o ering rebates is similar to a HILO (Promotional) price format (but not identical due to breakage and slippage). Thus, our model can be interpreted as a vertical competition game in which each player has to adopt either an EDLP or HILO price format.
Before we present our analysis, let us provide a preview of our main results. In our model, each rm evaluates the trade-o between the xed cost of launching a rebate program and the additional gross pro t generated by the rebate program. Let f R (f M ) denote the retailer's (manufacturer's) xed promotion cost. A basic intuition is that the retailer (or the manufacturer) would o er rebates if its xed cost f R (or f M ) is below some break-even point f R (or f M ). Clearly, if each of the rms is non-strategic, in the sense that it does not take the other rm's decision into consideration when making its own decision, then these thresholds f R and f M are constants as illustrated in Figure 1(a) . However, in a competitive environment, each player is strategic and takes the other party's decision into consideration. Figure 1(b) shows a typical example of the rms' rebate strategies in equilibrium. As a result of strategic interaction, the structural form of the rebate strategies in equilibrium becomes fairly complex and non-intuitive. For instance, a higher xed cost does not necessarily discourage the manufacturer from o ering rebates; i.e., it is possible that the manufacturer would o er rebates at (
., see points A and B in Figure 1(b) ). Our analysis also reveals an interesting phenomenon: a more e ective manufacturer rebate program (that generate more demand) would lead to a win-win situation in which both rms enjoy higher pro ts, while a more e ective retailer rebate program could lead to a win-lose situation in which the manufacturer enjoys a higher pro t and the retailer obtains a lower pro t. In addition, we show that, depending on the attributes of each rm's rebate program, the equilibrium can take a structural form which is di erent from that in Figure 1 (b). Our model captures the strategic interactions between rms in a supply chain as well as the speci cs of each rm's rebate program.
Insert Figure 1 about here.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of related literature. In Section 3 we rst model the demand and pro t functions associated with di erent pricing and rebate strategies, and then we explicate the underlying approach for analyzing the Stackelberg game. Section 4 presents the rebate and pricing strategies of both rms in equilibrium. In Section 5, we conduct a numerical analysis to investigate the impact of various parameters in equilibrium. Section 6 concludes this paper with some suggestions for future research.
Literature Review
The literature in sales promotion (e.g., Blattberg and Neslin (1990) ) delineates three types of promotions (see Figure 2 ): trade promotions from the manufacturer to the retailer, retailer promotions from the retailer to the consumer, and manufacturer promotions from the manufacturer to the consumer (which are sometimes called consumer promotions). To entice retailers to increase sales e orts for certain brands, the corresponding manufacturer often o ers trade promotions in various forms: o -invoice discounts, discounts based on the retailer's order quantity, discounts based on the retailer's actual sales, etc. As articulated by Buzzell et al. (1990) , retailers do not always pass the bene ts of the trade promotion on to consumers. This observation has motivated many marketing researchers to analyze the e ectiveness of di erent types of trade promotions (c.f., Lal (1990a), Neslin et al. (1995) , Lal et al. (1996) , and Tyagi (1999) ). Trade deals have also been examined in the context of supply chain contracts. For instance, Taylor (2002) shows that a manufacturer's rebates paid to a retailer for each unit sold beyond a target level can achieve supply chain coordination. Dr eze and Bell (2003) show that retailers prefer o -invoice trade promotions, whereas manufacturers prefer price discounts based on the retailer's actual sales quantity during the promotion period. Comprehensive reviews of supply chain contracts can be found in Cachon (2003) and Tang (2006) . Our paper di ers from this literature in that we do not consider trade promotions; instead, we focus on both retailer and manufacturer rebates.
Insert Figure 2 about here.
Retailer promotions have also received attention among marketing researchers. One common form of retailer promotion is a price discount. By examining di erent analytical models, researchers nd di erent reasons for o ering price discounts including: retailers' inventory holding cost is higher than that of the customers (e.g., Blattberg et al. (1981) ), price discrimination among heterogeneous consumers (e.g., Varian (1980) , Narasimhan (1988) ), competition among multiple retailers (e.g., Lal (1990b), Raju et al. (1990) and Rao (1991) ), and reference price e ects (e.g., Winer (1986), Greenleaf (1995) , Kopalle et al. (1996) ). Another common form of retailer promotions is in-store coupons (c.f., Blattberg and Neslin (1990) and Neslin (2002) ). This stream of research focuses on retailer promotions in two major settings: horizontal competition among stores, and the interaction between retailers and customers. In contrast, we examine the interaction between retailer promotions and manufacturer promotions in the context of a vertical competition game.
To ensure that customers receive price discounts during the promotion period, manufacturer rebates are becoming a common form of manufacturer promotions in the durable goods markets.
First, Gerstner and Hess (1991) consider a model with two market segments in which the customers in one of the segments have a higher reservation price and a higher transaction cost of rebate redemption. By considering 4 di erent settings { trade deals only, manufacturer rebates only, a combination of trade deals and manufacturer rebates, and retailer rebates only { they examine the conditions under which a particular setting can be used to motivate a retailer to serve both segments e ectively. Second, by considering a case in which a retailer needs to determine the order quantity so as to meet uncertain demand, Chen et al. (2007) examine the impact of manufacturer rebates on the manufacturer's and retailer's expected pro ts. They show that manufacturer rebates always bene t the manufacturer unless the redemption rate is 100%. Third, in a similar setting as They show that, relative to no rebates, channel rebates yield higher pro ts for both the retailer and the entire supply chain; however, manufacturer rebates yield higher pro ts for the retailer but not necessarily for the entire supply chain. Fourth, Baysar et al. (2007) analyze a Stackelberg game between a manufacturer and a retailer and show that manufacturer rebates perform better than trade deals when the market potential is highly uncertain.
Our paper complements the rebate literature in two signi cant ways. First, we consider a vertical competition game in which each rm (manufacturer or retailer) makes three decisions: the regular (wholesale or retail) price, whether or not to o er a rebate program, and the rebate value should the rm decide to launch a rebate program. Hence, the pricing and rebate strategies for each rm to deploy are determined endogenously. Second, our model explicitly captures a rm-speci c xed cost (advertising, distributing rebate coupons, etc.) that a rm will incur when launching a rebate promotion program. In the context of retailer rebate coupons, Blattberg and Neslin (1990) illustrate that this xed cost varies between 30% and 66% of the total promotion budget. We evaluate the trade-o between this xed cost and the additional pro t generated by the rebate program, and establish the conditions under which a rm (manufacturer or retailer) should o er rebates in equilibrium.
Lastly, we note that our vertical competition game between a manufacturer and a retailer complements the models of horizontal competition between two retailers, each of which chooses between the EDLP and the HILO price format. Lattin and Ortmeyer (1991) and Lal and Rao (1997) show that both EDLP and HILO stores can coexist in equilibrium under certain conditions.
The Model
Consider a two-level supply chain comprising two players: a manufacturer (leader) and a retailer (follower). The manufacturer, indexed by i = M , sells a single type of product through the retailer, indexed by i = R, over a short selling season. At the beginning of the selling season, each rm speci es a rebate strategy (i.e., o er rebates to customers or not) and then decides on the regular price and rebate value (if any). Throughout this paper, we shall focus on the case in which each rm will consider using rebates as the only promotion mechanism. We use superscripts j and k to denote the manufacturer's and the retailer's rebate strategies, respectively. As noted before, o ering no rebates (o ering rebates) is akin to an EDLP (HILO) price format; hence, we let j and k equal E when no rebate is o ered and equal H when rebates are o ered.
The manufacturer and the retailer enter a Stackelberg game (Figure 3) . In stage 1, the manufacturer (leader) decides on the rebate strategy j 2 fE; Hg. For any given manufacturer rebate strategy j 2 fE; Hg selected in stage 1, the manufacturer chooses the regular wholesale price w j in stage 2. If j = H, then the manufacturer needs to determine the rebate value r H M to be o ered over a pre-speci ed promotion period captured by an exogenously speci ed parameter M 2 (0; 1). 3 For instance, M = 0:2 means that the manufacturer o ers rebates 20% of the time during a selling season. Clearly, if j = E, r E M = 0. Given the manufacturer's pricing and rebate strategy, (w j ; r j M ), the retailer (follower) rst decides on the rebate strategy k 2 fE; Hg. Then the retailer chooses a regular retail price p k . If k = H, the retailer needs to specify the rebate value r H R to be o ered over a pre-speci ed promotion period captured by an exogenously speci ed parameter R 2 (0; 1). If k = E, r E R = 0. Once both rms make their rebate and pricing decisions, denoted by (w j ; r j M ; p k ; r k R ), the demand function and the pro t functions for both rms are determined.
Insert Figure 3 about here.
3 Pre-specifying a promotion period is not uncommon in practice. For instance, Barilla pre-speci es their promotion periods (c.f., Hammond (1994) ), some electronics manufacturers pre-specify their special introductory promotion periods, and some retailers pre-specify their promotion periods (Robinson's Saturday Early Bird special promotion, Nordstrom's Yearly Sales Event, etc). This setting is similar to the mixed equilibrium concept (e.g., Varian (1980) , Narasimhan (1988) ) where manufacturer/retailer randomize their prices in any given time period.
Demand and Pro t Functions
When neither rm o ers rebates (i.e., j = k = E), we assume a linear demand function D = a bp E , where a > 0 represents the base demand and b > 0 represents the sensitivity of the demand to the regular retail price p E . To ensure that D > 0, we assume the regular retail price p k 2 (0; a b ) for k = E; H and the regular wholesale price w j 2 (0; a b ) for j = E; H. Our model captures three major e ects when rm i 2 fM; Rg o ers rebates of value r i : (i) the demand is increased by b i r i , where b i (> 0) denotes the sensitivity of the demand to the rebate value, (ii) the pro t margin of rm i is reduced by i r i , where i (2 (0; 1]) denotes the redemption rate of rebates, and (iii) a xed cost f i (> 0) is incurred for promoting, distributing, and processing rebates. Below, we elaborate the impact of these three e ects on the demand and pro ts of the rms. Table 1 summarizes our notation.
Insert Table 1 about here.
Rebates increase demand in two ways: rebates may increase the base demand (the size of a market) by inducing customers to consume more, and they may entice new customers to buy the product at a lower rebate-reduced price (see Bell et al. (1999) , Bell and Boztug (2007) , and the references therein for details). The additional demand generated by rebates of value r i is captured For any rebate value r j M chosen by the manufacturer and any pricing strategy (p k ; r k R ) chosen by the retailer, the total demand over the selling season can be written compactly as:
For example, when the manufacturer o ers a rebate (r H M > 0) and the retailer o ers no rebate (r E R = 0) (i.e., j = H and k = E), the demand is equal to (a bp E +b M r H M ) during the manufacturer's rebate promotion period and is equal to (a bp E ) during the remainder of the selling season. Since M represents the relative length of the manufacturer rebate promotion period, the total demand over the entire season is equal to
To model the pro t function of each rm, let us consider the pro t margin and the xed cost associated with a rebate program. To simplify our exposition, we assume that the unit manufacturing cost incurred by the manufacturer, the unit operations cost incurred by the retailer, and the unit rebate promotion cost incurred by the manufacturer/retailer are zero. The exact same approach can be used to analyze the case when these unit costs are positive.
Using the redemption rate i , we can represent the manufacturer's e ective pro t margin as Thus, the actual redemption rate i does not a ect the demand directly.
A constant marginal cost per unit time f i > 0 is incurred when rm i o ers rebates over a promotion period i . The cost f i captures di erent xed advertising and processing costs associated with the rebate promotion, and it does not depend on the rebate value nor the number of rebates claimed. Hence, the total xed cost associated with a rebate program is equal to i f i . 4 Then the manufacturer's pro t M (w j ; r j M ; p k ; r k R ) and the retailer's pro t R (w j ; r
are:
Backward Induction Steps
Before we present the analysis of our Stackelberg game, let us describe the decision making process associated with the following backward induction steps. For ease of reference, we use parentheses in the superscripts of decision variables and pro ts to denote their optimal values at the corresponding nodes in Figure 3 . For example, at node (j; k) = (E; E), p (E;E) represents the optimal value of the regular retail price p E . At node (j; k) in stage 4, the retailer uses information (i.e., the manufacturer's rebate strategy j and the corresponding pricing strategy (w j ; r j M ) and the retailer's rebate strategy k) to determine the optimal regular price p (j;k) and optimal rebate value r (j;k) R that maximize his pro t function R (w j ; r j M ; p k ; r k R ) given in (3). The retailer solves the following program:
By de nition, r (j;E) R = 0. We suppress the fact that p (j;k) and r
At node (j) in stage 3, the retailer determines the optimal rebate strategy k (j) by choosing the larger of the two pro ts (4), yielding:
The retailer's best response rebate strategy can be prescribed as follows:
o ; and
By de nition, r E M = 0 when j = E. Hence, the sets T (E;E) and T (E;H) depend only on w E . At node (j) in stage 2, the manufacturer knows his rebate strategy j chosen in stage 1 and anticipates the retailer's best response: k (j) , p (j;k (j) ) , and r
. Hence, the manufacturer can determine his optimal pricing strategy (w (j; ) ; r (j; ) M ) at node (j) by solving: 5 (P 2)
where M (w j ; r j M ; p k ; r k R ) is given in (2) . Given the manufacturer's optimal pricing strategy (w (j; ) ; r (j; ) M ), we can retrieve the retailer's best response (i.e., k (j; ) , p (j; ) , and r (j; ) R ) from (6) and from the optimal solution to problem (P4) accordingly.
At stage 1, the manufacturer can determine his optimal pro t ( ) M and the corresponding optimal rebate strategy j ( ) by choosing the larger of the two pro ts associated with j = E and j = H given in (7), yielding:
Substituting j = j ( ) into k (j; ) , (w (j; ) ; r 
Analysis
This section is organized as follows. In Section 4.1, we analyze the equilibrium of subgame 1 for the case when j = E (i.e., the manufacturer o ers no rebates). By following the backward induction steps as described in the last section, we present the results associated with problems (P4), (P3), and (P2), respectively. In Section 4.2, we use the same approach to analyze subgame 2 for the case when j = H. By comparing the manufacturer's pro ts under rebate strategies j = E and j = H, we determine the Stackelberg equilibria by solving problem (P1) in Section 4.3.
Subgame 1: The manufacturer o ers no rebates
When the manufacturer o ers no manufacturer rebates (i.e., j = E), r E M = 0, so we shall suppress this decision variable throughout this section. By examining the optimal solution to problem (P4) associated with node (E; k) in stage 4 for k = E or H, we have: Proposition 1 Consider the case when the manufacturer o ers no rebates (i.e., j = E).
(a) Suppose the retailer o ers no rebates (i.e., k = E). Then, for any given regular wholesale price w E , problem (P4) yields:
and
(b) Suppose the retailer o ers rebates (i.e., k = H) and the following condition holds:
Then, for any given regular wholesale price w E , problem (P4) yields: 
, greater discounts are always preferred and no interior solutions exist. When R is small, the range that
can take is fairly wide (e.g., this range is between 1 and 9 when R = 0:2). As such, condition (11) is not restrictive. For the remainder of this paper, we assume it holds.
By examining (10), (12) and (13), we can show that:
Part (a) shows that the retailer's optimal regular (discount) price under the HILO format (i.e., when k = H) is higher (lower) than the optimal regular retail price under the EDLP format (i.e., when k = E). Also, part (b) shows that the average retail price under the HILO format is higher than the regular price under the EDLP format when the retailer rebate sensitivity b R is su ciently high. These results are consistent with the empirical results presented in Ho et al. (1998) .
By comparing the retailer's pro ts associated with the EDLP and the HILO price formats given in (10) and (14) as in problem (P3), we establish the following result:
Proposition 2 For any given regular wholesale price w E under the case when j = E, the retailer's best response rebate strategy in stage 3, k (E) , satis es:
where
Proposition 2 suggests that the retailer should not o er rebates when the wholesale price w E is high. This result is intuitive because, when the wholesale price is high, the retailer cannot a ord to o er retailer rebates with a meager pro t margin. Notice that E 0 when f R f a R , where
Hence, the retailer should not o er rebates (i.e., k (E) = E) when the retailer's xed promotion cost f R exceeds the threshold f a R . This result is also intuitive. Given the retailer's best response rebate strategy k (E) stated in Proposition 2 and the corresponding pricing strategy stated in Proposition 1, we can specify the manufacturer's pro t function as follows:
It is easy to check from (16) and (19) that w E = maxf a 2b ; E g is the optimal wholesale price that maximizes the pro t function M given in (19) 
Proposition 3 Suppose the manufacturer o ers no rebates (i.e., j = E). Then the manufacturer's optimal wholesale price w (E; ) and the resulting pro t (E; ) M in stage 2 can be expressed as:
By using the optimal wholesale price w (E; ) given in Proposition 3, we can apply the results stated in Propositions 2 and 1 to retrieve the retailer's optimal rebate strategy k (E; ) and optimal pricing strategy (p (E; ) ; r (E; ) R ), getting:
Corollary 2 Suppose the manufacturer o ers no rebates (i.e., j = E). Corresponding to the manufacturer's wholesale price w (E; ) , the retailer's best response and the resulting pro t are:
We now interpret Proposition 3 and Corollary 2 in conjunction with the impact of the xed cost f R on the equilibrium outcomes ( Figure 4 ). (The analytical details are provided in the Appendix.)
First, consider the`base case' when the xed cost f R is su ciently high; i.e., f R f E R . Corollary 2 suggests that the retailer should not o er rebates and that
(as shown in Proposition 3). The former is intuitive and the latter corresponds to the double marginalization result of a decentralized supply chain in which the manufacturer (leader) earns twice the pro t of the retailer (follower) (c.f., Spengler (1950) ). Second, consider the case when f R is su ciently low; i.e., when
Corollary 2 suggests that the retailer should o er rebates. This result is intuitive. Also, it is easy to check that both rms earn higher pro ts than those in the base case when f R f E R . The increase of pro t is mainly due to the additional demand generated from the retailer rebates.
Hence, lowering the xed cost f R can lead to a win-win situation. This observation implies that there is incentive for both rms to develop mechanisms for reducing the xed cost f R .
Insert Figure 4 about here.
Next, let us examine the case when the xed cost f R 2 [f E R ; f E R ). We obtain two counter-intuitive results as depicted in Figure 4: (1) the retailer's pro t is increasing in the xed cost f R ; and (2) the average retail price, R (p (E; ) r
, is decreasing in the xed cost f R . To explain these counter-intuitive results, let us rst consider the case when f R = f E R . In this case, it is easy to check from Proposition 3 that the manufacturer's optimal wholesale price is the same as in the base case, and that the retailer would o er rebates and obtain the same pro t as in the base case. Now, consider the case when the retailer's xed promotion cost f R exceeds f E R . In this case, the retailer's pro t will be below the base case if the retailer o ers rebates. This implies that there is no incentive for the retailer to o er rebates unless the manufacturer is willing to lower the wholesale price w (E; ) . By anticipating the retailer's rebate strategy, Proposition 3 and Figure   4 (b) suggest that, in order to obtain a win-win situation, it is bene cial for the manufacturer to reduce the wholesale price w (E; ) so as to induce the retailer to o er rebates. As a result of this reduced wholesale price, the retailer will o er a lower average retail price, enjoy a higher demand, and obtain a higher pro t as the xed cost f R increases over [f E R ; f E R ).
Finally, consider the case when the xed promotion cost f R = f E R . Figure 4 highlights the fact that there are two equilibria. Speci cally, Proposition 3 suggests that the manufacturer may
as these two wholesale prices will lead to the same pro t for the manufacturer. It is easy to check from Corollary 2 and Figure 4 (a) that the retailer would obtain a higher pro t in the latter case.
Notice that the backward-induction outcomes presented in Proposition 2 and Corollary 3 can also be represented by thresholds associated with b R and R . For instance, we can rst obtain the thresholds b E R and b E R by expressing f E R and f E R in terms of b R , respectively. Then we can derive the equilibrium according to the intervals as de ned by b E R and b E R and obtain similar results: the retailer should not o er rebates if the incremental demand generated from rebates b R is below the threshold b E R . To reduce duplication, we shall focus on our discussion on the impact of the xed costs f R and f M in equilibrium.
Subgame 2: The manufacturer o ers rebates
When the manufacturer o ers rebates (i.e., j = H), he needs to determine the regular wholesale price w H and the rebate value r H M . We now present our results for subgame 2 by following the same approach as presented in Section 4.1. By examining the solution to problem (P4) associated with the node (H; k) in stage 4 for k = E or H, we have: Proposition 4 Consider the case when the manufacturer o ers manufacturer rebates (i.e., j = H). (a) Suppose the retailer o ers no rebates (i.e., k = E). Then, for any given regular wholesale price w H and manufacturer rebate value r H M , problem (P4) yields:
(b) Suppose the retailer o ers rebates (i.e., k = H). Then, for any given regular wholesale price w H and manufacturer rebate value r H M , problem (P4) yields:
Proposition 4 is analogous to Proposition 1 if one treats a + M b M r H M as a in the demand function and treats w H as w E . This is because, when j = H, the corresponding total demand is increased by M b M r H M . Therefore, if one views this as an increase in the base demand a and views the decision variable w H as w E , then the retailer's pro t functions associated with nodes (E; k) and (H; k) are identical. Similarly, by comparing the optimal retail prices under k = E and under k = H, we obtain identical results as shown in Corollary 1 of subgame 1.
By comparing the retailer's pro ts (H;E) R and (H;H) R given in (20) and (23), respectively, we can determine the retailer's best response k (H) for problem (P3) as follows:
Proposition 5 For any given regular wholesale price w H and rebate value r H M under the case when j = H, the retailer's optimal rebate strategy in stage 3, k (H) , satis es:
Notice that Proposition 5 is analogous to Proposition 2 if one views a + M b M r H M as a. As r H M increases, the e ective base demand a+ M b M r H M increases, the threshold H given in (25) increases, and the size of the corresponding set T (H;H) also increases. Therefore, as the manufacturer o ers a higher rebate value, the retailer can a ord to o er rebates that would result in a lower margin but higher sales.
We now analyze the manufacturer's pricing decision associated with node (H) in stage 2. In preparation, we substitute the retailer's optimal prices given in Proposition 4 into (2) The results presented in Proposition 6 and Corollary 3 for the case when j = H possess the same structure as those presented in Proposition 3 and Corollary 2 for the case when j = E. Speci cally, there exist thresholds f H R and f H R that are analogous to the thresholds f E R and f E R as de ned in Proposition 3. This analogy can be seen as follows. First, the retailer should not launch a rebate program when the xed promotion cost f R is su ciently high; i.e., f R f H R . Second, the impact of f R on the optimal prices and pro ts as shown in Figure 5 is similar to those as shown earlier in Figure 4 . The counter-intuitive results observed from Figure 4 for the case when f R 2 [f E R ; f E R ) in subgame 1 continue to occur for the case when f R 2 [f H R ; f H R ) in subgame 2.
Insert Figure 5 about here.
Stackelberg Equilibrium
To determine the manufacturer's optimal rebate strategy j ( ) in stage 1, we now compare the manufacturer's optimal pro t 
Lemma 1 The threshold f E
R associated with subgame 1 and the threshold f H R associated with subgame 2 satisfy: f E R < f H R :
Combining Lemma 1 with the fact that f E R < f E R and f H R < f H R , one can check that there are only 3 cases to consider that depend on the value of f E R :
. Based on our extensive numerical experiments, we have observed that Case (I) is prevalent, Case (II) is rare, and Case (III) is non-existent. For instance, Table 2 shows that out of 243 scenarios, Case (II) has occurred in only 6 scenarios and Case (III) has never occured. Hence, we shall focus our analysis on Case (I) and discuss Case (II) at the end of this section.
Insert Table 2 about here.
To determine the manufacturer's rebate strategy j ( ) and the corresponding retailer's rebate strategy k (j ( ) ) (or k ( ) in short) in equilibrium for Case (I), we need to compare the manufacturer's pro t functions 
, and I 5 [ f H R ; 1). These comparisons enable us to characterize the manufacturer's rebate strategy j ( ) and the retailer's rebate strategy k ( ) in equilibrium as follows:
is constant over interval I 1 , convex and increasing over I 2 , increasing linearly over I 3 , concave and decreasing over I 4 , and is constant over I 5 .
(which is concave and decreasing in f M ); and equals
, and k ( ) = E, otherwise. Figure 6 illustrates the manufacturer's rebate strategy and the retailer's rebate strategy in equilibrium presented in Theorem 1. In Figure 6 , the horizontal axis represents the retailer's xed cost f R and the vertical axis represents the manufacturer's xed cost f M . Parts (a) and (b) are illustrated in Figure 6 : the manufacturer's rebate strategy is divided along the threshold function f M (f R ) and the retailer's rebate strategy is divided along the threshold function f R (f M ), respectively. As a result of these divisions, the entire space of (f R ; f M ) can be partitioned into 4
regions, each of which depicts a speci c pair of rebate strategies that both parties will adopt in equilibrium. For example, the upper left region denoted by (E; H) corresponds to the case in which the manufacturer o ers no rebates (i.e., j ( ) = E) and the retailer o ers rebates (i.e., k ( ) = H) in equilibrium.
Insert Figure 6 about here.
The unusual shape of the regions depicted in Figure 6 highlights the e ect of competition on the rebate strategies in equilibrium. To elaborate, let us rst establish a simple benchmark by considering the case when each party is non-strategic in the sense that each party acts independently without taking the other party's decision into consideration. In this case, the rebate strategy for each party is based on a constant break-even point at which the xed promotion cost is equal to the additional gross pro t generated by the rebate promotion. Consequently, the entire space of (f R ; f M ) is partitioned according to one horizontal line and one vertical line, resulting in 4 di erent regions that take on rectangular shapes. Next, in a competitive environment, each player is strategic in the sense that each party will take the other party's decision into consideration. As a result, as highlighted in part (a), the manufacturer's rebate strategy in equilibrium j ( ) depends on the retailer's xed cost f R via the threshold function f M (f R ). Part (b) can be interpreted in the same manner.
To explain the shape of equilibrium regions in Figure 6 , we examine the structural property of 
By applying the results stated in Propositions 3 and 6 (i.e., as f R increases, both H M and
are initially constant, decrease in a concave fashion, and then stay constant), we can trace the property of f M (f R ) as a function of f R over those ve intervals as stated in part (c).
Since the unusual shape is primarily due to the fact that the threshold function value' associated with one additional degree of freedom: the manufacturer has the exibility to select the manufacturer rebate value in addition to the wholesale price when j = H. This explains why f M (f R ) is increasing in f R over I 3 so that the corresponding region for j ( ) = H expands. In other words, o ering manufacturer rebates is`relatively more attractive' to the manufacturer over interval I 3 .
The structural form of the equilibrium leads to a counter-intuitive result: a higher xed cost does not necessarily discourage the manufacturer from o ering rebates. In all cases, if it is optimal for a rm to o er no rebates, then it is always optimal to o er no rebates with a higher xed cost of his own as long as the xed cost of the other party remains constant. However, Figure 6 reveals that it is possible that switching to o ering rebates can be optimal for the manufacturer when his xed cost is higher if there is also an increase in the retailer's xed cost (see points A and B in Figure 6) .
A natural question then is "when do the equilibrium regions described in Figure 6 take a`usual' rectangular form?" Part (e) in Theorem 1 indicates that, as the`implicit' bene t of rebate promotion
and f R (f M ) become constant. This is a limiting case where the thresholds obtained in the subgames 1 and 2 are approaching each other: f E R ! f H R and f E R ! f H R . In this case, the manufacturer rebate program is approaching break-even or its frequency is approaching zero; thus, the manufacturer becomes indi erent between o ering rebates and not. It can be also shown that f M (f R ) ! 0 and
i.e., the manufacturer would not o er rebates in equilibrium and the retailer would o er rebates in equilibrium if and only if f R f E R = f H R . Having derived the rebate strategies in equilibrium, we now retrieve the pricing strategies and the resulting pro ts in equilibrium from the outcomes of subgames 1 and 2. To do so, let us de ne Figure 6 ). In all of our numerical experiments, we have found that f 1 M < f 2 M , so we shall focus our subsequent discussion on this case. When f M < f 1 M , the manufacturer o ers rebates in equilibrium (i.e., j ( ) = H); hence, the prices and pro ts in equilibrium are equal to those presented in Proposition 6 and Corollary 3 (presented in Appendix) in subgame 2. When
M , the manufacturer o ers no rebates in equilibrium (i.e., j ( ) = E); hence, the prices and pro ts in equilibrium are equal to those presented in Proposition 3 and Corollary 2 in subgame 1.
, the unusual shape of equilibrium regions in Figure 6 leads to an unexpected result: as f R increases, the manufacturer's rebate strategy j ( ) changes from E to H and then from H to E. Figure 7 illustrates the equilibrium pro ts and prices over f R for any given 
. This result suggests that the retailer is indi erent whether or not the manufacturer o ers rebates over interval I 3 . For the remaining case when f M 2 [f 1 M ; f 2 M ), the manufacturer's rebate strategy j ( ) changes from H to E. We omit the details of this case.
Insert Figure 7 about here.
Next, we consider Case (II) where f
. Case (II) occurs only when the manufacturer's promotions are so e ective that even when the retailer's xed cost f R is as high as f E R , the retailer nds it optimal to o er rebates without receiving some discounts in the wholesale price. Instead of the intervals I 2 ; I 3 , and I 4 in Case (I), we need to consider the following three intervals of f R :
Using the same approach as in Case (I), we can show that the rebate strategies in equilibrium have the structural property depicted in Figure 8 .
By comparing Figures 6 and 8 , we observe two major di erences in the equilibrium between Case (I) and Case (II). First, the threshold
is increasing in f R 2 I 3 in Case (I). This happens because unlike Case (I), the manufacturer does not have to reduce its wholesale price over the interval I 0 3 in Case (II) in order to induce the retailer to o er rebates. Second, the threshold f R (f M ) changes more with respect to f M in Case (II), i.e.
. This suggests that when the manufacturer o ers no rebates due to a high cost f M , the retailer is also less likely to o er rebates because the retailer does not bene t from the increased demand that would have been generated by the manufacturer's promotions to consumers.
Insert Figure 8 about here.
Comparative Statics
In this section we investigate the impact of the e ectiveness of retailer (and manufacturer) rebate promotion b R (and b M ) on the rebate and pricing strategies in equilibrium. Since we obtain all equilibrium outcomes in closed forms, one can examine the comparative statics analytically. We manage to do so for subgame 1, but the analysis for subgame 2 is highly complex. 
The Impact of Retailer Rebate Promotion
To examine the e ect of b R on the equilibrium, we increase the value of b R from 0.8 to 0.82. As b R increases, customers become more responsive to retailer rebates. The changes in the rebate strategies in equilibrium are illustrated in Figure 9 . To examine the changes in the pro ts and the pricing strategies in equilibrium, we have conducted the numerical analysis for di erent values of f M and obtained similar results. For illustrative purposes, we present in Figure 10 the case when f M = 0:9; hence, j ( ) = E from Figure 9 . Upon examining Figures 9 and 10 , we make the following observations:
1. The threshold function f R (f M ) increases in b R for any given value of f M . However, the threshold function f M (f R ) is not monotone in b R for any given value of f R . Moreover, the
2. The retail price p (E; ) and wholesale price w (E; ) are nondecreasing in b R , but the retail rebate value r
is not monotone in b R for any given value of f R .
3. The manufacturer's pro t 
. This counter-intuitive result arises from the fact that the threshold f E R (at which the manufacturer would start to reduce the wholesale price) increases as b R increases. This is because, knowing that the retailer has more (intrinsic) incentive to o er rebates as b R increases, the manufacturer has less incentive to lower the wholesale price to entice the retailer to o er rebates. This dynamics has caused the retailer's pro t to decrease in equilibrium over this interval. By using the same logic, one can show that f M (f R ) and r (E; ) R are not monotone in b R .
The Impact of Manufacturer Rebate Promotion
To examine the e ect of b M on the equilibrium, we increase the value of b M from 0.8 to 1. As b M increases, customers become more responsive to manufacturer rebates. The changes in the rebate strategies in equilibrium are illustrated in Figure 11 . To examine the changes in the pro ts and the pricing strategies in equilibrium, we have conducted the numerical analysis for di erent values of f M and obtained similar results. For illustrative purposes, we present in Figure 12 for the case when f M = 0:3; hence, j ( ) = H from Figure 11 . Upon examining Figures 11 and 12 , we make the following observations:
1. The threshold function f R (f M ) is nondecreasing in b M for given value of f M , and the threshold function f M (f R ) is increasing in b M for any given value of f R . Moreover, the thresholds f
2. The retail price p (H; ) , the wholesale price w (H; ) and the manufacturer rebate value r As b M increases, the additional demand generated by the manufacturer rebate program increases. As such, o ering rebates become more attractive to the manufacturer. This is re ected in Figure 11 in the following sense: as the threshold function f M (f R ) increases in b M (for any given value of f R ), the region in which the manufacturer would o er rebates in equilibrium expands.
As b M increases, the retailer also enjoys a higher demand because the`e ective' base demand
As such, o ering retailer rebates (in addition to manufacturer rebate) becomes more attractive to the retailer. This is re ected in Figure 11 where the threshold function f R (f M ) is increasing in b M (but at a slower pace than f M (f R ) as illustrated in Figure   11 ). As a consequence of more e ective rebate promotions o ered by the manufacturer, one can observe from Figure 12 that all prices and pro ts in equilibrium are increasing in b M except that the retailer's pro t Our numerical experiments highlight an interesting phenomenon: when b M increases, both rms enjoy higher pro ts in equilibrium (Figure 12(a) ). However, when b R increases, the manufacturer's pro t always improves but the retailer's pro t could su er for certain values of f R in equilibrium.
This phenomenon seems to suggest that it is in the interest of both rms to focus on increasing the value of b M instead of b R . This may explain why many retailers continue to work closely with the manufacturers to promote manufacturer rebate programs.
Concluding Remarks
In many product categories, both manufacturers and retailers use rebates to generate additional sales. While rebates have been recognized as an e ective promotional tool, rms are debating whether to continue their rebate programs due to certain adverse e ects. In this paper, we have analyzed the rebate and pricing decisions of a supply chain comprising a manufacturer and a retailer.
Our goal is to determine the conditions under which a rm should o er rebates in a competitive setting. A basic intuition is that the rms' rebate strategies in equilibrium can be speci ed by a should o er rebates in equilibrium. Clearly, if each of the rms is non-strategic in the sense that it does not take the other rm's decision into consideration when making its own decision, then these thresholds f R and f M are constants. However, as the rms enter a Stackelberg game, they become strategic. This strategic behavior results in more complex forms of the thresholds. Our formal analysis has provided a deeper understanding of the strategic behavior of the rms in equilibrium.
Through our analysis, we have obtained the following results:
1. For any given manufacturer's rebate and pricing strategies, we have shown that the retailer would o er rebates if the wholesale price is lower than a certain threshold. This result is intuitive because, when the wholesale price is high, the retailer cannot a ord to o er retailer rebates with a meager pro t margin. This threshold is even higher when the manufacturer o ers manufacturer rebates mainly because the manufacturer rebate program generates additional demand.
2. For any given manufacturer's rebate strategy, we have obtained counter-intuitive results: the retailer's pro t is increasing and the average retail price is decreasing in the cost f R over a certain interval. These results are due to the strategic behavior of the manufacturer who would reduce the wholesale price in that interval of f R so as to entice the retailer to o er rebate promotions. This shows that strategic interactions between the two rms can create a win-win situation.
3. We have shown that there are three forms of rebate strategies in equilibrium, depending on the ordering of the thresholds f H R , f H R and f E R . However, our extensive numerical work suggested that in most cases these thresholds satisfy: f H R < f E R < f H R . This observation enables us to focus on this particular ordering of thresholds (i.e., Case (I)). Our analysis shows that the retailer's threshold f R (f M ) is a non-increasing function of f M . This suggests that if the manufacturer would not o er rebates due to the high promotion cost, then the retailer is also less likely to o er rebate promotions. On the other hand, the manufacturer's threshold
is not a monotonic function of f R . This leads to a counter-intuitive result: a higher xed cost of the manufacturer does not necessarily discourage the manufacturer from o ering rebates if there is also an increase in the xed cost of the retailer.
4. Our numerical analyses highlighted an interesting phenomenon: a more e ective manufacturer rebate program (i.e., a higher value of b M ) always leads to a win-win situation in which both rms enjoy higher pro ts; however, a more e ective retailer rebate program (i.e., a higher value of b R ) could lead to a win-lose situation in which the manufacturer enjoys a higher pro t but the retailer su ers from a lower pro t. This phenomenon is due to the strategic behavior of the manufacturer who acts as the leader in a Stackelberg game. Therefore, it is in the interest of both rms to develop initiatives to improve the e ectiveness of the manufacturer's rebate program.
Our work provides several avenues for future research. First, the manufacturer and the retailer may want to coordinate their promotions in various ways. For instance, suppose the retailer can choose to synchronize its timing of promotions with the manufacturer's promotions. For the case when R = M = , our analysis (omitted) shows that the retailer would never synchronize its promotional timing in equilibrium. This result seems to suggest that, unless the coordination of rebate promotions o er additional demand due to a compounding e ect or additional savings in the promotional costs to both parties, there is little incentive to coordinate rebate promotional plans. Therefore, one potential avenue of research is to examine the conditions under which both parties would coordinate their rebate promotions in equilibrium. Second, we have assumed that the bene ts and costs of promotions are constant and known. In reality, some of these parameters may depend on each other or may depend on the value of certain decision variables. For instance, the redemption rate i may increase with the rebate value r i , the promotional frequency i may decrease with the rebate value r i , and the rebate sensitivity b i and the xed promotion cost f i may vary with the frequency of promotions i . Several papers reviewed in Section 2 partially address some of these issues; however, to obtain tractable results, these papers rely on certain simplifying Information asymmetry could be an interesting extension of the model presented in this paper.
Finally, we have focused on vertical competition in this paper. It could be instructive to extend our model by considering both horizontal and vertical competition.
Proof of Proposition 1. (a) The results follow immediately from the rst-order condition associated with the problem max p E (p E w E )(a bp E ).
(b) If R is jointly concave with respect to p H and r H R , then the problem max p H ;r H R R (w E ; p H ; r H R ) has a unique pair of optimal solutions (p (E;H) ; r (E;H) R ) given w E . For R to be jointly concave, 
Condition in (26) can be simpli ed as:
Note that the left-hand side of (27) is less than 1 and the right-hand side of (27) is greater than (12), (13) , and M = 0 into (3), we obtain the retailer's optimal pro t in (4). As 
Therefore, cross exactly once at w E = E , where E is given in (17) . 2
Proof of Proposition 3. Notice from (17) that E = a 2b when f R = f E R . We consider the following three intervals of f R : (i) f R f a R ; (ii) f E R < f R < f a R , and (iii) 0 f R f E R : (i) If f R f a R , E 0, hence w (E; ) = a 2b and
8b is attained at w E = a 2b and
. 
where, the positive intermediate terms B 1 through B 6 (which depend on parameters other than f R and f M ) are de ned as:
Proof of Proposition 6. We follow the procedure similar to the proof of Proposition 3. Let (w (H;E) ; r it su ces to show that H
